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Hobbes’s political philosophy departs from a number of premises that 
are supposed to be self-evident, supplemented by various observations 
from experience. These statements are examined critically and in their 
interrelatedness in order to fi nd out to what extent Hobbes provides 
a convincing system of thought. The importance of the basis of man’s 
actions, his self-interest, is inquired, since it serves as the basis of his 
practical philosophy. After this, Hobbes’s views on ‘moral’ notions are 
expounded. As it turns out, Hobbes maintains a number of concepts that 
have such a connotation, but interprets these in a specifi c way. The ar-
ticle is concluded with a modest systematic reconstruction of Hobbes’s 
main thoughts in practical philosophy.
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Introduction
In this article, the foundations of Hobbes’s practical philosophy are laid 
bare. His views are expounded in order to make it clear what his prac-
tical philosophy means and what its implications are. Practical phi-
losophy can also be called ‘moral philosophy’, a term used by Hobbes 
himself,1 just as ‘moral law’.2 As will be shown, in Hobbes’s case this 
does not mean he fails to problematize the notions often dubbed ‘moral’, 
such as ‘good’, ‘evil’, ‘right’ and ‘wrong’. In fact, his analysis of ‘mor-
al philosophy’ is detrimental to any approach that does not explicate 
them. A number of viewpoints are presented in a more or less geometri-
cal guise, in that axioms are used that are not proven but rather taken 
to be immediately clear, apparently not requiring a corroboration, on 
1 E.g., Leviathan, Ch. 15 (110).
2 E.g., De Cive (the English version), Ch. 4, § 1 (76).
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the basis of which an a priori system of thought is erected, although the 
role of experience is also considered.
First, I will briefl y comment on Hobbes’s methodology in general, 
so that it will be clear how his empirical outlook may be reconciled 
with the presence of axioms. Then, in the second section, the basis of 
man’s actions is identifi ed as self-interest. It is maintained that both 
consciously and naturally, one seeks out what is benefi cial to oneself. 
This, one might say, somewhat meager approach to human motivation 
needs to be supplemented by an inquiry into the ‘moral’ notions, so that 
an alternative account, starting with them, is excluded. The third sec-
tion is focused on that. Finally, the fourth section shows how the views 
presented are related.
The diffi culty in (re)constructing a philosopher’s view thus is that no 
clearly demarcated model, waiting to be discovered, is extant. Hobbes 
does not present his ideas in the way I will expound them (otherwise, 
part of this article would be superfl uous). Attempts have been made to 
put forward one’s ideas geometrically,3 or to systematize the thoughts 
of others in this fashion.4 This article is limited both in scope and ambi-
tion, not directed at Hobbes’s philosophy in its entirety but at its most 
important part, namely, his practical philosophy.
Moreover, an interpretation according to one’s own predilections 
looms. This danger is not great with Hobbes, who is usually clear and 
seldom ambiguous, providing elucidative examples in cases where mis-
interpretation might occur. The risk of a ‘tunnel vision’ or confi rmation 
bias is reduced for the same reason. This doesn’t mean that misinterpre-
tation may not still occur, but one has to make an effort and apply a pro-
crustean method, leaving none of Hobbes’s main points intact, in order 
to do so, which has, I think, nonetheless sometimes been done. That an 
interpretation is realized with which Hobbes himself would completely 
concur, which is, of course, the ideal, is not realistic—as one can only 
know what he wrote and must always interpret his words in some way—
but in this contribution I shall make an effort, by working consistently 
and taking everything he says seriously, to come as close as possible.
1. The nature of practical philosophy’s axioms
Although Hobbes maintains that knowledge is acquired empirically, 
elements that may be qualifi ed a priori in the modern usage are sig-
nifi cant in his philosophy. He states knowledge of fact originally to be 
sense5 and the senses to be the sources of conceptions.6 Knowledge of 
consequences, alternatively, which is also presented as science, is con-
3 Notably, Spinoza’s Ethica.
4 Spinoza may serve as an example here, again (Renati Des Cartes Principiorum 
Philosophiae Pars I & II).
5 Leviathan, Ch. 7 (47).
6 Leviathan, Ch. 1 (13), Ch. 3 (20); cf. Ch. 2 (15).
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sidered to be of a conditional nature,7 especially since science is pre-
sented as “[…] the knowledge of Consequences, and dependance of one 
fact upon another […].”8 One may detect a precursory analysis to that of 
Hume, who reduces the objects of human reason to matters of fact and 
relations of ideas,9 although this parallel should not lead to a simplistic 
(and perhaps even procrustean) interpretation. In this case, too, expe-
rience is stated to be the origin: “[…] the understanding of [all manner 
of Sciences] (because CHRIST hath not delivered it) is to be learnt from 
reasoning, that is to say by making necessary consequences, having 
fi rst taken the beginning from experience.”10
The English version of De Cive can, incidentally, be said to leave 
some doubt whether this really applies to all sciences, stating: “[…] all 
manner of Sciences, which (comprehended under the Title of Philoso-
phy) are necessary partly to live, partly to live well […].”11, although 
the comma before ‘which’ may indicate an amplifying clause and hence 
confi rm this; the issue at hand, however, is whether reasoning neces-
sarily starts with experience. This is not per se the case if one follows 
the presentation in the English version (it may contingently be the 
case that reasoning starts thus), but the Latin version is clearer in this 
respect, stating: “Horum scientia […] ratiocinatione, id est, texendo 
consequentias initio sumpto ab experientiis, addiscenda est.”12, which 
renders, literally translated: “the understanding of these […] is to be 
learned by reasoning, that is, by joining consequences having taken 
the beginning from experiences.” The phrase ‘id est’ (‘that is’) makes it 
clear that a necessary connection is taken to exist here.
To return to the general point, the fact that experience serves as the 
basis of knowledge doesn’t mean that interpreting (part of) Hobbes’s 
philosophical enterprise as being based on (presumably) self-evident 
starting-points is doomed to fail. First, the interpretation is a construc-
tion (namely, by the interpreter of his thoughts), in which the results 
are not necessarily presented in the same way Hobbes himself did. Sec-
ondly, related to this, the fact that (factual) knowledge is acquired em-
pirically doesn’t mean that such a system cannot be realized, albeit, in 
that case, afterwards. Thirdly, Hobbes may be said to have argued that 
political philosophy should be developed mathematically.13 Fourthly, 
Hobbes adduces the existence of self-evident truths: “It is of it selfe 
manifest, that the actions of men proceed from the will […].”14
7 Leviathan, Ch. 7 (47).
8 Leviathan, Ch. 5 (35).
9 D. Hume, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, Section 4, Part 1 (35).
10 De Cive (the English version), Ch. 17, § 12 (229).
11 De Cive (the English version), Ch. 17, § 12 (229).
12 De Cive (the Latin version), Ch. 17 § 12 (261).
13 L. Strauss, Hobbes’ politische Wissenschaft in ihrer Genesis, 157–158.
14 De Cive (the English version), Ch. 5, § 1 (85).
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Diffi cultly, however, he does acknowledge primary propositions, but 
characterizes them as defi nitions,15 stating that axioms do not fi t this 
qualifi cation.16 In Leviathan, it is made clear that defi nitions need to be 
used in order to reach scientifi c statements;17 “[…] a man that seeketh 
precise truth, had need to remember what every name he uses stands 
for; and to place it accordingly […].”18 Signifi cantly, Hobbes points to 
the problematic conclusions that may be reached if one starts with defi -
nitions, but he limits this to situations in which ‘wrong’ defi nitions are 
used. In fact, I think the use of defi nitions is more problematic than 
Hobbes proposes, but this is not the place for a detailed analysis of that 
issue.
2. Self-interest
As was pointed out, Hobbes dismisses axioms, although he accepts the 
possibility, and even existence, of self-evident truths. A number of ba-
sic starting-points, which may, I think, irrespective of Hobbes’s prima 
facie qualifi cation, be qualifi ed as axioms, are, as I will try to demon-
strate, implicitly present in his practical philosophy.
The most basic axiom can be found by inquiring on what basis peo-
ple act. Obviously, their actions have a great number of goals, and even 
organizing these goals may leave many categories. Still, Hobbes main-
tains that all voluntary actions have something in common, namely 
that they are based on self-interest: “[…] of the voluntary acts of every 
man, the objects is some Good to himselfe.”19 (It would, in my opinion, 
be a mistake to claim that self-interest has practically disappeared in 
Leviathan,20 particularly if this is partly based on the fact that the spe-
cifi c objects for people vary,21 since this merely means that the content 
of the motivations differs.)
On the basis of this presentation, it may be thought that this is a 
contingent given—man happens to want something for himself—but 
Hobbes specifi es that this is a natural process (which also includes non-
voluntary actions): “[…] every man by nature seeketh his own benefi t, 
and promotion […].”22 Moreover, man necessarily acts in a self-inter-
ested manner: “[…] every man, by naturall necessity desires that which 
is good for him […].”23
Some empirical evidence is put forward, but not in such a way that 
15 De Corpore, Pars 1, Cap. 3, § 9 (33); Cap. 6, § 13 (72).
16 De Corpore, Pars 1, Cap. 3, § 9 (33).
17 Leviathan, Ch. 7 (48).
18 Leviathan, Ch. 4 (28).
19 Leviathan, Ch. 14 (93) (cf. Ch. 15 (105)); The Elements of Law, Part 1, Ch. 3, 
§ 6 (99); De Cive (the English version), Ch. 2, § 8 (55).
20 F. McNeilly, ‘Egoism in Hobbes’, 205.
21 Ibid.
22 Leviathan, Ch. 19 (133).
23 De Cive (the English version), Ch. 1, § 13, (49). Hobbes mentions this in the 
context of his depiction of the state of nature, but the statement is of a general 
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a decisive conclusion is reached if experience serves as the standard. 
That this is not the standard, and the self-interest premise is indeed 
an axiom, is the only alternative; that this approach is opted by Hobbes 
also follows from the following formulations: “[…] every man is pre-
sumed to seek what is good for himselfe naturally […].”24; “[…] every 
man is presumed to do all things in order to his own benefi t […].”25 
This stance has both strengths and weaknesses. The a priori man-
ner of observing behavior has the benefi t that a defi nite conclusion is 
reached, rather than one in which conclusive results are not always to 
be expected, as in empirical investigations, in which one usually has to 
settle for a provisional outcome, to be complemented and specifi ed by 
further research.
This benefi t is at the same time its downside, however: how can one 
say anything about man’s actions without (extensively) inquiring the 
actual behavior? One may argue: “No axiom demonstrates that people 
make choices that serve their best interests; this is a question to be 
answered based on evidence.”26 Part of the problem is removed if one 
focuses on the analysis of the notions. In this way, an action (or, rather, 
the agent) may simply be dubbed self-interested, even reducing pity 
to one’s own position, stating: “Griefe, for the Calamity of another, is 
PITTY; and ariseth from the imagination that the like calamity may 
befall himselfe; and therefore is called also COMPASSION, and in the 
phrase of this present time a FELLOW-FELLING […].”27 The analysis is 
consistent: from the fact that one imagines one’s own suffering, one 
suffers as well (com-passion). No room is left in Hobbes’s viewpoint for 
actions that would primarily seem to be directed at others’ benefi t, such 
as sacrifi cing oneself, particularly since it is against reason to give up 
one’s life.28
These actions should be accounted for and should perhaps be quali-
fi ed as self-interested, albeit in another sense than the only one for 
which Hobbes leaves room. It would, e.g., be unimaginable in his line 
of thought that people sacrifi ce themselves, the more so since “[…] ev-
ery man is desirous of what is good for him, and shuns what is evill, 
but chiefl y the chiefest of naturall evills, which is Death; and this he 
doth, by a certain impulsion of nature, no lesse then that whereby a 
Stone moves downward […].”29 Of course, strictly speaking, this situa-
tion doesn’t qualify as one in which a ‘voluntary motion’ is decisive, but 
nature, and man’s drive is not merely thus in that situation, as is clear from the way 
man in the civil state is described (cf., e.g., Ch. 6, § 4 (93)).
24 De Cive (the English version), Ch. 3, § 21 (70).
25 Leviathan, Ch. 15 (109).
26 C. Jolls, C. Sunstein, R. Thaler, ‘A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics’, 
1545.
27 Leviathan, Ch. 6 (43).
28 E.g., De Cive (the English version), Ch. 1, § 7 (47).
29 De Cive (the English version), Ch. 1, § 7 (47); cf. The Elements of Law, Part 1, 
Ch. 1, § 6 (83). The notions ‘good’ and ‘evil’ are not qualifi ed ‘morally’, since the issue 
is what is good (and evil) for every man. In section 3, this will be elaborated upon.
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rather an ‘animal motion’,30 but appetite and desire are decisive in both 
cases,31 and besides, it would be diffi cult to grasp, given Hobbes’s view 
of the object of man’s voluntary actions,32 how a voluntary action could 
counter this animal motion. Since an exposition on this matter would 
diverge too much from the present issue, I will leave it out here.
Finally, Hobbes says: “[…] the proper object of every man’s will, 
is some Good to himselfe.”33 The word ‘good’ is obviously not to be un-
derstood in a ‘moral’ sense. How Hobbes considers ‘moral’ notions will 
be indicated in section 3, but ‘proper’ might be taken thus, so that 
the sentence would be read as: ‘every man’s will should (‘morally’) be 
something he values.’ This would render the outcome that one should 
(‘morally’) act in one’s self-interest, which would be redundant, since 
he states, as was shown, that self-interest lies at the root of (voluntary) 
actions. Moreover, as I will argue in the next section, ‘moral’ notions 
are not maintained by Hobbes, at least not in the sense (expounded in 
the traditional approach) that they would have a meaning linked to 
something ‘good’ in an absolute sense, absolute standards being absent 
in this regard. ‘Proper’ is, accordingly, to be understood here as ‘real’ 
(or ‘right’ in a non-‘moral’ sense).
3. The analysis of ‘moral’ notions 
If self-interest is in each case decisive, the question is pertinent wheth-
er actions based on ‘moral’ convictions are excluded. ‘Moral philoso-
phy’ is, for Hobbes, the science of what is good and evil.34 In Leviathan, 
natural laws, which will be dealt with below, are called ‘moral laws’, 
“[…] consisting in the Morall Vertues, as Justice, Equity, and all hab-
its of the mind that conduce to Peace, and Charity […].”35 ‘Moral laws’ 
are taken (broadly) to mean the laws that “[…] concern the manners 
and conversation of men, one towards another […].”36 In De Cive, the 
moral law is identifi ed with the natural law.37 Gauthier rightly points 
to the specifi c (divergent) meaning of Hobbes’s ‘moral’ contentions: “[…] 
Hobbes’s concepts are practical, moral in so far as ‘moral’ means ‘prac-
tical’, ‘concerning what to do’, but not in so far as ‘moral’ means ‘op-
posed or superior to prudential’.”38
30 Leviathan, Ch. 6 (38).
31 Leviathan, Ch. 6 (38).
32 Cf. note 19, supra.
33 Leviathan, Ch. 25 (176); cf. De Cive (the English version), Ch. 1, § 7 (47).
34 Leviathan, Ch. 15 (110).
35 Leviathan, Ch. 26 (197).
36 The Elements of Law, Part 1, Ch. 5, § 1 (111).
37 De Cive (the English version), Ch. 4, § 1 (76).
38 D. Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan (28). Cf. G. Herbert, ‘The Non-normative 
Nature of Hobbesian Natural Law’ (4): “What morality there is in Hobbes’s philosophy 
is political. It reduces to obeying the law or, in the state of nature, to a willingness 
to prefer peace.”
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How ‘virtue’ is treated and what ‘justice’ means, according to 
Hobbes, will be shown below. ‘Equity’ is simply linked to the given that 
an unequal treatment leads to war,39 and, irrespective of that, as ap-
pears from the quote, peace as the goal is the pivotal factor. Peace is not 
necessarily something ‘good’ and must, in the line of thought presented 
above, be considered to be the outcome of a selfi sh deliberation.
‘Charity’ is a somewhat diffi cult matter. Hobbes says little about 
this in both Leviathan and De Cive. It is clear that the sovereign must 
provide for (some) public charity.40 In the context of what Hobbes prop-
agates, this is merely necessary in order to prevent the citizens from 
resisting the sovereign’s reign. After all, if he is unable to protect them 
(anymore), they are exempt from obedience to him.41 In De Cive, this 
is applied directly to the present issue, including happiness in the rea-
sons to institute a government, the sovereign acting against his self-
interest if he should not support his subjects.42 The issue is somewhat 
complicated in this respect, since improving the subjects’ strength is 
also the sovereign’s mission.43 This may be carried through in general, 
charity supposedly lessening the mutual threats between people. A 
beggar to whom some alms are given, e.g., is (ceteris paribus) less likely 
to rob someone than one who is not. Of course, this is speculative as 
Hobbes doesn’t mention this situation; moreover, in the state of nature, 
no property (in the strict sense) exists44 whereas in the civil state, the 
beggar should be kept from breaking the law except if he would other-
wise die of starvation. Still, this interpretation of ‘charity’ appears to be 
most in line with Hobbes’s general argumentation.
Importantly, “Good, and Evill, are names that signifi e our Appe-
tites, and Aversions; which in different tempers, customes, and doc-
trines of men, are different: And divers men, differ not onely in their 
Judgement, on the senses of what is pleasant, and unpleasant to the 
tast, smell, hearing, touch, and sight; but also of what is conformable, 
or disagreeable to Reason, in the actions of common life.”45
This might still leave the option of something existing as ‘good as 
such’ or ‘good in itself’, but Hobbes doesn’t refer to this and it plays no 
part in his practical philosophy. (He does exclude the existence of a 
‘highest (or greatest) good’.46) A common ground can, then, be found, 
but only with regard to the way the actions are organized. A parallel 
to the self-interest analysis is evident: people are all intent on fi nding 
39 Leviathan, Ch. 15 (108).
40 Leviathan, Ch. 30 (239).
41 Leviathan, Ch. 21 (153).
42 De Cive (the English version), Ch. 13, § 4 (158).
43 De Cive (the English version), Ch. 13, § 4 (158); cf. Leviathan, Ch. 30 (240): 
“[…] The good of the Soveraign and People, cannot be separated.”
44 Leviathan, Ch. 13 (90); cf. Ch. 24 (171).
45 Leviathan, Ch. 15 (110); cf. Ch. 6 (39); De Cive (the English version), Ch. 3, § 
31 (74), Ch. 14, § 17 (177, 178).
46 Leviathan, Ch. 11 (70).
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pleasure and avoiding pain, but what exactly they seek varies from one 
case to the next. In the civil state, a standard is introduced, but arti-
fi cially and without any ‘moral’ aspirations. In a common-wealth, the 
civil law serves as the measure of ‘good’ and ‘evil’.47
I argued that, according to Hobbes, at the basis of man’s actions lies 
self-interest, but the specifi c objects of these actions vary. He concret-
izes this somewhat when he defi nes ‘law of nature’: “A LAW OF NATURE 
(Lex naturalis,) is a Precept, or generall Rule, found out by Reason, by 
which a man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive of his life, or 
taketh away the means of preserving the same; and to omit, that, by 
which he thinketh it may be best preserved.”48 (In Leviathan, the in-
defi nite article is used here, reserving the defi nite article for the actual 
laws of nature; in De Cive, less consistently, the defi nite article is used 
in the general description as well.49)
The inclination to survive has already been discussed. Reason 
doesn’t serve another purpose than an instrumental one (dismissing, 
for example, a Kantian approach): “[…] REASON, [when wee reckon 
it amongst the Faculties of the mind], is nothing but Reckoning (that 
is, Adding and Substracting) of the Consequences of generall names 
agreed upon, for the marking and signifying of our thoughts […].”50; 
“[…] deliberation is nothing else but a weighing, as it were in scales, 
the conveniences, and inconveniences of the fact that we are attempt-
ing; where, that which is more weighty, doth necessarily according to 
its inclination prevaile with us.”51
Reason as such doesn’t, consequently, provide ‘moral’ standards. 
The fact that the laws of nature—which are deemed theorems52—are 
considered to be dictates of reason53 means that the outcome of delib-
eration ‘forces’ man to a course of action, namely to preserve his life. 
One is ‘forbidden’, which seems to have some ‘moral’ connotation, but, 
given Hobbes’s other statements, this can only mean that this is the 
only reasonable course to take; reason forbids man to act thus as it 
would confl ict with one’s self-interest. This is also the way it forbids (in-
ter alia) theft and adultery.54 In De Cive, he does defi ne the law of na-
ture as “[…] the Dictate of right Reason […].”,55 but ‘right reason’ is an 
instrumental faculty.56 Only by disregarding Hobbes’s observations on 
the ‘moral’ concepts can it be argued that there is a ‘moral’ obligation to 
obey the law(s) of nature.57 A link between his position in this respect 
47 Leviathan, Ch. 29 (223); cf. Ch. 46 (469).
48 Leviathan, Ch. 14 (91).
49 De Cive (the English version), Ch. 2, § 1 (52).
50 Leviathan, Ch. 5 (32).
51 De Cive (the English version), Ch. 13, § 16 (166).
52 Leviathan, Ch. 15 (111).
53 Leviathan, Ch. 15 (111).
54 De Cive (the English version), Ch. 14, § 10 (174).
55 De Cive (the English version), Ch. 2, § 1 (52).
56 De Cive (the English version), Ch. 2, § 1 (52).
57 A. Taylor, ‘The Ethical Doctrine of Hobbes’, 411.
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and a Kantian imperative may be suggested, but only by producing an 
unfounded interpretation (circumventing the problems involved with 
taking the ‘moral’ notions at face value).58
The right of nature, which serves in Hobbes’s model as the counter-
part to the laws of nature in that it presents the basic freedom in the 
state of nature, being restricted by the laws of nature—people realize 
that restricting this freedom is necessary in order to leave the state of 
nature—has no ‘moral’ value.59 It is defi ned as “[…] the Liberty each 
man hath, to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for the preserva-
tion of his own Nature; that is to say, of his own Life; and consequently, 
of doing any thing, which in his own Judgement, and Reason, hee shall 
conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.”60
Hobbes does say: “The [natural] Law […], in the means to Peace, 
commands […] Good Manners, or the practise of Vertue: And there-
fore it is call’d Morall.”61 Signifi cantly, the fact that peace is considered 
something good (in the sense of agreeable) is put forward as the reason 
why modesty, equity, trust, humanity and mercy are virtues: they are 
conducive to peace.62 Warrender claims that ‘right’ is used as (besides 
that which one cannot be obliged to renounce) that to which one is mor-
ally entitled, but fails to support this.63 By contrast, it is, in accordance 
with the line of thought presented, more compelling to say that “[…] 
the Hobbesian ‘moral’ system is nothing more than a system of com-
mon, or universal, prudence.”64
Harvey offers a partially convincing analysis, but seems to smuggle 
in traditional conceptions of ‘morality’. He rightly says that “[…] what 
Hobbes has done is recast the traditional understanding of moral vir-
tue into a prudential, instrumentalist mold.”65, and that “[…] the Laws 
of Nature require us to create a moral system that embodies objective 
claims of right.”66 Taking such a line of though seriously seems dif-
fi cultly reconcilable with the claim that ‘fair dealing’ and ‘propriety’ 
in the traditional sense would be involved.67 The unwarranted holding 
on to the traditional elements in this interpretation is clear in the fol-
lowing: “[…] we are rationally bound to abide by our moral obligations 
58 A. Taylor, ‘The Ethical Doctrine of Hobbes’, 409.
59 Cf. G. Herbert, ‘The Non-normative Nature of Hobbesian Natural Law’ (15): 
“Natural right is a natural liberty only because there is no sovereign, mortal or 
Divine, to coerce one into acting otherwise. As such it is non-moral.”
60 Leviathan, Ch. 14 (91); cf. De Cive (the English version), Ch. 1, § 7 (47). ‘Liberty’ 
is defi ned, ‘morally’ neutrally, as “[…] the absence of externall Impediments […].” 
(Leviathan, Ch. 14 (91).
61 De Cive (the English version), Ch. 3, § 31 (75).
62 De Cive (the English version), Ch. 3, § 31 (74–75); cf. The Elements of Law, 
Part 1, Ch. 4, § 14 (110).
63 H. Warrender, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 18–19.
64 D. Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan, 98.
65 M. Harvey, ‘Hobbes’s Voluntarist Theory of Morals’, 59.
66 M. Harvey, ‘Hobbes’s Voluntarist Theory of Morals’, 59.
67 M. Harvey, ‘Hobbes’s Voluntarist Theory of Morals’ (60, 62).
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insofar as doing so leads to self-preservation, peace and the safe pur-
suit of felicity. Crucially, however, the moral obligations so incurred 
remain free-standing: each party to such voluntary agreements mer-
its proper performance on the part of their fellows as their due. For 
Hobbes, moral obligation is an emergent but non-reducible property of 
rational obligation.”68
Zagorin’s approach suffers from the same problem. Criticizing, 
among others, Gauthier,69 he points to Hobbes’s view of the law of na-
ture as incorporating “[…] a large body of morals and virtues, including 
peace and peacebleness, a concern for life, civility, benevolence, and 
equal consideration for others, that would have to be a part of any true 
system of morality, irrespective of its underlying philosophic princi-
ples.”70 I have above pointed to the meaning of peace, the concern for 
life, civility and benevolence for Hobbes. Equal consideration for others 
will be discussed below. It is, on the basis of the considerations in this 
section and the previous one, possible and would, I think, constitute the 
most convincing account, to present a consistent analysis of Hobbes’s 
thinking without clinging to traditional ‘moral’ categories.
The actual laws are important in order to know the foundation, ac-
cording to Hobbes, of the common-wealth. Originally, people are sup-
posed to live in a condition of war, in which the threat of combat is 
continuously present,71 and which they seek to escape by erecting a 
common-wealth.72 (It may be debated whether Hobbes considered this 
an actual situation or utilized it as a mere thought experiment. He 
points to America in his own time73 and, at the international level, the 
competition between nations.74 It is, for the line of thought presented in 
this article, not decisive whether the historical approach is opted.) The 
commands contained in the laws of nature presuppose that one has in-
suffi cient power to simply do what one wants (to continue living) with-
out having to make concessions to others. A crucial premise, then, is 
that people are (approximately) equally strong, both in the strict sense 
(body strength) and in the broad sense, including mental capacities,75 
which Hobbes takes from experience (implicitly76 and explicitly77).
A circle seems to emerge, since Hobbes insists—arguing this as the 
ninth law of nature in Leviathan—that people acknowledge their mu-
tual equality.78 After all, if this equality needs to be presupposed for the 
laws of nature to apply at all, it would be strange that it appears as one 
68 M. Harvey, ‘Hobbes’s Voluntarist Theory of Morals’, 63.
69 P. Zagorin, Hobbes and the Law of Nature (47; 145, note 97).
70 P. Zagorin, Hobbes and the Law of Nature (48).
71 Leviathan, Ch. 13 (88–89).
72 Leviathan, Ch. 17 (117–118).
73 Leviathan, Ch. 13 (89).
74 Leviathan, Ch. 13 (90).
75 Leviathan, Ch. 13 (86–87).
76 Leviathan, Ch. 13 (86–87).
77 De Cive (the English version), Ch. 1, § 3 (45).
78 Leviathan, Ch. 15 (107).
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of the laws. Still, he maintains inequality (according to which people 
suppose themselves superior to others) to be against reason (and ex-
perience).79 This ninth ‘dictate of reason’ may then serve as a rule to 
counter the passion that lies at the root of this stance. The basic equal-
ity is located at a higher level and serves as a necessary condition for 
the human condition, whereas the situation covered by the ninth law 
of nature applies to man’s refl ection once he fi nds himself confronted 
with this situation.
Because of the defi nition of ‘right of nature’—man may use his pow-
er as he deems fi t—if the mitigations presented by the ninth law of 
nature were absent, a more or less stable situation would ensue with-
out the need to establish a sovereign power artifi cially. This is why it 
can be said: “[…] if there had been any man of power Irresistible; there 
had been no reason, why he should not by that power have ruled, and 
defended both himselfe, and [men], according to his own direction.”80 
Apparently, this hypothetical man is presented as irresistibly power-
ful, but not as omnipotent, for notwithstanding his qualities, he still, so 
it is said, seeks to protect others, which can, with the general self-inter-
ested motivation in mind, only be explained if he needs their services, 
for whatever reason.
Conscience is mentioned as decisive in some occasions. The word 
‘conscience’ may have a ‘moral’ connotation; it needs to be inquired how 
Hobbes uses this notion. He indicates that it would be against reason 
for someone to observe the laws of nature if others don’t, since this 
would make him vulnerable. In general, the laws of nature keep their 
force, but this doesn’t apply if they cannot safely serve as directives: 
“[…] the Law of Nature doth alwayes, and every where oblige in the 
internall Court, or that of Conscience, but not always in the externall 
Court, but then onely when it may be done with safety.”81
From what has already been said about the laws of nature and the 
meaning of the ‘moral’ notions, it is clear that ‘conscience’ doesn’t add 
a ‘moral’ dimension. The account in Leviathan removes any ambiguity: 
“The Lawes of Nature oblige in foro interno; that is to say, they bind 
to a desire they should take place: but in foro externo; that is, to the 
putting them in act, not alwayes.”82 It is only possible to argue that 
conscience has a ‘moral’ meaning for Hobbes if one contributes a mean-
ing to the word that is not mentioned or alluded to by him. Here, just 
as in the case of ‘moral philosophy’, ‘reason’, ‘virtue’, and ‘justice’, (cf. 
79 Leviathan, Ch. 15 (107).
80 Leviathan, Ch. 31 (247). Incidentally, in the religious dimension, such an 
instance is provided: “The right of nature, whereby God reigneth over men, and 
punisheth those that break his Lawes, is to be derived not from his Creating them, 
as if he required obedience, as of Gratitude for his benefi ts; but from his Irresistible 
Power.” Leviathan, Ch. 31 (246).
81 De Cive (the English version), Ch. 3, § 27 (73).
82 Leviathan, Ch. 15 (110); cf. The Elements of Law, Part 1, Ch. 4, § 10 (108) and 
De Cive (the English version), Ch. 4, § 21 (83).
168 J. Doomen, Interpretation of Hobbes’s Practical Philosophy
notes 34, 50, 62, supra; 91, 92, infra), it is necessary to ascertain what 
Hobbes himself says without relying on preconceived meanings. The 
notions can be dubbed ‘moral’ concepts, but only if ‘moral’ is taken to 
mean ‘practical’.83 The observation that “The laws of nature as moral 
rules always exert a claim on the human conscience to be disposed to 
comply with them, which can hardly be true of the motive of self-inter-
est.”84 can only be correct if ‘conscience’ is interpreted in the traditional 
way, which Hobbes opposes.
Of the laws of nature, the fi rst and third (following the Leviathan 
presentation) are the most important ones here. The fi rst (fundamen-
tal) law of nature is: “[…] to seek Peace, and follow it.”85, which follows 
from the general rule of reason “[…] That every man, ought to endeav-
our Peace, as farre as he has hope of obtaining it […].”86 ‘Ought’ does not 
point to a ‘moral’ obligation (except in Hobbes’s idiosyncratic sense) any 
more than ‘forbidden’ above would to a ‘moral’ prohibition, for Hobbes 
bases this rule of reason on man’s need (i.e., his self-interest) to evade 
the state of nature.87 One cannot link ‘ought’ to a (Kantian) deontology88 
as long as one wants to remain close to what Hobbes actually says.
The third law of nature, which follows from the second—people 
mitigate their right to defend themselves to the same degree others 
do89—is “[…] That men performe their Covenants made […].”90 This is a 
corollary to the motivation to evade the state of nature, no additional 
(‘moral’) grounds being present. This means that the notion ‘justice’ 
is equally ‘morally’ empty: “[…] in this law of Nature, consisteth the 
Fountain and Originall of JUSTICE. For where no Covenant hath pre-
ceded, there hath no Right been transferred, and every man has right 
to every thing; and consequently, no action can be Unjust. But when 
a Covenant is made, then to break it is Unjust: and the defi nition of 
INJUSTICE, is no other than the not Performance of Covenant.”91 Jus-
tice is defi ned as keeping of covenant, and is “[…] a Rule of Reason, 
by which we are forbidden to do any thing destructive to our life; and 
consequently a Law of Nature.”92 The same analysis of ‘forbidden’ as 
above applies here.
The coming about of a common-wealth is necessary because people 
don’t always act by means of reason; in fact, “[…] the Passions of men, 
are commonly more potent than their Reason.”93 If reason were domi-
nant in this regard, the laws of nature would be decisive and the state 
83 Cf. D. Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan, 27, 67, and note 38, supra.
84 P. Zagorin, Hobbes and the Law of Nature, 105.
85 Leviathan, Ch. 14 (92).
86 Leviathan, Ch. 14 (92).
87 Leviathan, Ch. 14 (91).
88 A. Taylor, ‘The Ethical Doctrine of Hobbes’, 424.
89 Leviathan, Ch. 14 (92).
90 Leviathan, Ch. 15 (100).
91 Leviathan, Ch. 15 (100).
92 Leviathan, Ch. 15 (103); cf. Ch. 26 (185).
93 Leviathan, Ch. 19 (131).
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of nature would not be identical with the state of war; since these laws 
confl ict with the passions, however, a common-wealth is necessary.94
This is the reason why Rousseau’s objection that one necessary 
yields to force, so that no duty would remain,95 is unwarranted: even 
irrespective of the fact, pointed out above, that Hobbes’s way of regard-
ing notions such as ‘duty’ idiosyncratically (Rousseau doesn’t make 
it clear what exactly he means by duty (‘devoir’) here, but it seems 
that his position differs from Hobbes’s even at this level of inquiry), 
Hobbes’s analysis of one’s duty takes place at a level prior to the one 
Rousseau discusses; that level is one which follows once one has acted 
as one should, not succumbing to one’s passions but acting upon reason. 
Rousseau’s distinction between duty and prudence96 is, from Hobbes’s 
perspective, nonexistent.
The passions are considered ‘commonly’ to be more potent than rea-
son. This seems to be more of an empirical observation than an axiom. 
It is signifi cant since it relativizes the merit of the laws of nature in 
realizing peace.
In a common-wealth, general rules (by means of civil laws) are es-
tablished, functioning as the measure of ‘good’ and ‘evil’.97 This doesn’t 
mean that ‘moral’ standards are introduced, but only that a single 
source of rules of conduct is appointed, i.e., the sovereign. An artifi cial 
criterion for ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ actions is thus apparent.98 The subjects 
are not supposed to act from ‘moral’ intentions, for people only obey 
the laws out of fear,99 weighing the advantages and disadvantages of 
breaking it.100 The link with self-interest is clear.
A great number of issues have been brought together in the above 
sections; the pattern that is discernable will be demonstrated in the 
last section by ordering the most important premises.
4. A systematic construction
As was mentioned in the introduction, the (modest) scheme that ex-
hibits the fundamentals of Hobbes’s practical philosophy and the way 
they are interrelated is a construction. It is warranted, I think, because 
nothing is included that Hobbes hasn’t stated and the positions of the 
various parts follow from the respective importance that is attributed 
to his respective contentions.
In the fi rst section it was argued that self-interest lies at the root 
of all voluntary and non-voluntary actions (cf. notes 19, 22, 23, supra). 
94 Leviathan, Ch. 17 (117).
95 J.-J. Rousseau, Du Contract Social, Livre 1, Cap. 3 (354).
96 J.-J. Rousseau, Du Contract Social, Livre 1, Cap. 3 (354).
97 Leviathan, Ch. 29 (223); Ch. 46 (469).
98 Leviathan, Ch. 15 (100, 101); Ch. 30 (239).
99 Leviathan, Ch. 27 (206); cf. De Cive (the English version), Ch. 14, § 8 (173): 
“[…] in vain is that Law which may be broken without punishment.”
100 Leviathan, Ch. 27 (203).
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This is, therefore, the most basic given. It is an axiom since Hobbes 
doesn’t derive it from experience per se; as was said, it has a semantic 
rather than an empirical justifi cation. The laws of nature are derived 
from the self-interested stance: it is through (right) reason that one 
fi nds out what the laws of nature are (cf. note 53, supra) and that one 
must continue to live (cf. notes 29, 48, supra).
If people were not (approximately) equally strong, these laws of na-
ture would not be observed. It is only because the most powerful per-
son is unable to overawe the rest that they compel (cf. note 80, supra). 
Since reason is not constantly one’s guide—one is usually rather driven 
by his passions (cf. note 93, supra)—the role of the passions needs to be 
taken into consideration, too. The laws of nature are theorems (cf. note 
52, supra), so they are not themselves (self-evident) starting-points, 
but rather the result of a deliberation, being derived from a calculus of 
the pros and cons of acting in some way, deliberation consisting in this 
process (cf. notes 50, 51, supra).
This applies not only to the fi rst and third laws of nature, which were 
mentioned in section 3, but to all of them. They are (virtually) all neces-
sarily (and explicitly) linked to peace, which is preferable to war and con-
sequently to be pursued if one acts reasonably. The ‘moral’ notions retain 
their practical value, but are not linked to ‘good’ and ‘bad’ as supposedly 
absolute standards, allegedly deciding that an action be ‘right’ or ‘wrong’.
The construction is then along these lines:
1. Basis
Axiom: Self-interest is ever decisive
Premise (from experience): People are approximately equally 
strong
2. Corollary
Defi nitional statement (claiming something about reason): Reason 
fi nds out what the laws of nature are
Theorems: the laws of nature
Premise (from experience): The laws of nature are observed
Defi nitional statement: The strength of the ‘moral’ concepts depends 
on their explanation of actual phenomena
3. Additional premise (from experience): The passions are more po-
tent than reason
4. Conclusion: a political state (common-wealth) is necessary
Conclusion
In his realistic presentation of the human political condition, Hobbes 
makes it clear on what basis actions come about. A minimal explana-
tion is provided, cleansed of any ‘moral’ elements, save those which 
Hobbes maintains in this guise, but in a specifi c sense. He thus puts 
forward a consistent account. It must be granted that the straightfor-
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ward analysis comes at the expense that it is somewhat shallow. Still, 
his analysis proves interesting and at times compelling and those in-
tent on combating its core cannot simply dismiss it.
It is not a matter of chance that Hobbes’s practical philosophy has 
been the topic of investigation; I have observed a number of parallels 
between his ideas and some of my own. I venture to claim that this has 
not interfered with an open interpretation in the sense that I have not 
molded his statements into something that can assuredly not be taken 
to represent his thoughts; that the danger that such a course of action 
would be taken is in Hobbes’s case slight, as he is usually clear, was al-
ready mentioned in the introduction. I leave it to the reader’s judgment 
whether some of the commentators on his philosophy have nonetheless 
fallen pray to said danger.
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